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Calendar
June 7-Denver Bar Association special luncheon meeting, 12:15 P.M.,
Shirley-Savoy Hotel. Frank E. Holman, Seattle, president-nominee
of the American Bar Association, speaker.
June 23-Denver Bar Association annual picnic, Park Hill Country Club.
July 22, 23 and 24-Tenth Judicial Circuit annual conference, Post Office
Building, Denver, Senior Circuit Judge Orie L. Phillips presiding.
September 6, 7, 8 and 9-American Bar Association annual meeting,
Seattle, Washington.

Unlawful Practice of the Law by Accountants
By JACOB V. SCHAETZEL
Member, Unlawful Practice of the Law Committee of the Colorado
Bar Association.
The giving of legal advice by accountants which is not connected with
accounting work done by him has been held to be the unlawful practice of
the law in New York. The New York Law Journal under date of April 14,
1948, reported a case against an accountant which had been decided on April
12, 1948, and in which the accountant was held guilty of the unlawful practice
of the law. One of the interesting parts of the case concerns the remarks of
the court in defining what an accountant may or may not do with regard to
income tax returns. From the facts it appears that the accountant gave certain
advice to a corporation on a tax question. He was not the auditor for the
company nor did he do any work of any kind on the books of the company.
He did not prepare the tax return. He was asked to give his opinion on a
tax question concerning a retail sales tax and compensating use tax attributable
to business done in certain years. At the time the company was considering
the compromising of the city's claims if it was legal for the company to deduct
the payment as an expense in 1943, rather than attribute the expense to the
years in which the claims accrued. The company's regular accountant, who
was also a lawyer, had given his opinion based on a decision of the United
States Supreme Court but the president of the company not being satisfied
with that opinion wanted the opinion of the accountant. Several conferences
were held and the accountant eventually gave his opinion to the president of
the company in writing. Later the accountant was not paid and when he
sued in the Municipal Court the defense was that the accountant, not being
a lawyer, was not entitled to collect for his services. There was no dispute
as to the facts. The bar association then joined in the suit and enjoined the
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accountant from practicing law and the court did not dwell on the accuracy
or adequacy of the advice given but stated that the decision must rest on
the nature of the services rendered and on whether they were inherently legal
or accounting services.
In the opinion, the court stated that "an accountant may know more
about the tax law than some law practitioners, just as a labor relations adviser,
trust officer or customs broker may know more about the law relating to their
businesses than many lawyers not specialists in the law relating to such business. A layman may know a lot of law about a particular subject, upon the
knowledge of which he may rely at his own risk in his own business. He may
not, however, set himself up as a public consultant on the law of his specialty.
If the services of a specialist in some particular branch of the law are required,
the public must still turn to the bar, for all the reasons of public protection
for which the bar and bar standards are maintained. The law specialist offers
more and much more is required of him for admission to practice than knowledge of his specialty. He must have a grounding in the law and a legal
education and training, must pass examinations in the law and attain and
maintain standards which are imposed by the bench ai.d bar for the protection
of the public."
The court further went on: "The law includes many specialties, perhaps
as diverse as specialties in medicine, but they are all related and integrated
in the common body of the law, much the same as specialties in medicine are
linked in the whole body of medicine. One might become informed, and even
expert, in some narrow specialty of medicine without the general. training,
preparation and experience required for admission to practice medicine. Yet
we know that only the generally trained doctor, grounded in medicine as a
whole, has the understanding requisite to practice medicine in any of its
branches, albeit the laboratories, so intimately and vitally connected with
medical service, are staffed by technicians who are not medical doctors."
"'Technicians are needed to serve in bureaus and agencies and in numerous
non-legal capacities, but the counselor licensed and trusted to advise the public
with respect to the law must be a duly qualified and admitted lawyer. We
are unable, therefore, to regard the admission of accountants, subject to certain
qualifications and regulations of the Treasury Department and the Tax Court,
'to practice before those agencies, as an authorization to accountants to practice
tax law at large or as an eradication of the distinction between the lawyer's
and the accountant's function in the tax field."
"More than most specialties in the law, tax law is drawn from and
involved with many branches of law. It bridges and is intimately connected,
for example, with corporation law, partnership law, property law, the law
of sales, trusts and frequently constitutional law. Quite obviously, one trained
only in accounting, regardless of specific tax knowledge, does not have the
orientation even in tax law to qualify as a tax lawyer. Equally obviously, as a
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matter of administration, he may not practice any phase of tax law, regardless of what might be his subjective qualifications for the particular undertaking. . . An objective line must be drawn, and the point at which it must
be drawn, at very least, is where the accountant or non-lawyer undertakes to
pass upon a legal question apart from the regular pursuit of his calling."
The court then states, "May the accountant then handle any tax problem
and as a 'tax consultant' entertain any tax question?" ... "Taxation, which
permeates almost every phase of modern life is so inextricably interwoven
with nearly every branch of law that one could hardly pick any tax problem
and say this is a question of pure- taxation or pure tax law wholly unconnected
with other legal principles, incidents or ramifications."
"This does not mean, of course, that many or most questions which may
arise in preparing a tax return may not be answered by an accountant handling
such work. But if the question is such a problem tnat an outside consultant,
besides the regular accountant preparing the tax return, must be called in to
do legal research of the kind which was necessary in this case, and to advise
as to the none too 'clear, if not obscure, law, that consultant must be a lawyer."
"The preparation of 'an income tax return is not primarily a matter of law,
and generally and mainly is not a matter of law. It may usually be prepared
by one having no legal knowledge, from instructions prepared for lay consumption, or by one having incidental legal knowledge. A taxpayer should
not be required, therefore,' and is not required, to go to a lawyer to have a
tax return prepared. It is a practical, reasonable and proper accommodation
to business men and the accounting profession not only to permit accountants
to prepare tax returns, but to permit them, despite the risks involved, to
assume jurisdiction of the incidental legal questions that may arise in connec,
tion with preparing tax returns. It is quite another thing to say that, apart
from preparing a tax return and from doing the accounting work in connection
with the return an accountant should be permitted as an independent con,
sultant to pass upon specific questions which are questions of law, especially
when the occasion for such consultation is apt to be, as it was in this case, a
particularly knotty question of law. The distinction is altogether valid and
desirable. The law here, as elsewhere, is a rational and practical adjustment
of conflicting interests, objectively calculated to be of the greatest public
benefit."
"We have heard no proposal that accountants be ousted from the income
tax field. It is precisely out of consideration of the interests which respondent
emphasizes that a taxpayer may, if he wishes, leave the entire preparation of
the tax return to his accountant, legal incidents included, without the necessity
of engaging a lawyer. It may, and probably will, remain true, as respondent
quotes the American Bar Association as noting, that the bulk of income tax
work is not handled by lawyers. When, however, a taxpayer is confronted
with a tax question so involved and difficult that it must go beyond its regular
accountant and seek outside tax law advice, the considerations of convenience
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and economy in favor of letting its accountant handle the matter no longer
apply, and considerations of public protection require that such advice be
sought from a qualified lawyer. At that point, at least, the line must be
drawn. The line does not impinge upon any of the business or public interests
which respondent cites, or oust the accountant from the tax field or prejudice
him in any way in the pursuit of his profession. It allows the accountant
maximum freedom of action within the field which might be called 'tax
accounting,' and is the minimum of control necessary to give the public pro,
tection when it seeks advice as to tax law."
It would appear to the writer of this article that this opinion is well
reasoned and clearly designates the field that an accountant can enter into
tax questions which are involved in the preparation of tax returns of all kinds.
The lawyer is an officer of the Court, trained by years of legal training and
bound by the ethics and laws of his profession and state. Accountants have
been known to file extensions of corporations, increasing of capital stock and
amending articles of corporations and doing the very things that the court
of New York says cannot be done. If any lawyer or individual in the State
of Colorado knows of any persons, including accountants, who are violating
the law concerning the unlawful practice of the law he is asked to refer such
a matter to the Unlawful Practice of the Law Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association, 828 Symes Building, Denver, Colorado.

Denver Metropolitan Area is Zoned
William T. Olson, director of the Tri-County Regional Planning Commission, recently reminded Denver attorneys of the existence of zoning laws
and building codes in the metropolitan area surrounding Denver. His reminder said:
There have come to our attention recently several instances of miscellaneous violations that lead us to believe that a reminder is needed
as to the zoning covering suburban Denver. I should like to take this
means of reminding you that the entire Metropolitan Area surrounding
Denver proper is covered by zoning laws, and a majority of the area is
also covered by a building code.
The zoning is reasonable, and highly beneficial for all interested in
the long-range progress and welfare of these communities. In instances
where hardship has been incurred or routine changes desired the respective
Planning Commissions and Boards of Adjustment for the three counties
(Adams, Arapahoe, and Jefferson) have been very liberal in granting
relief.
If you have any question requiring clarification as to zoning, building requirements, or land use in any part of this surrounding area, you can
obtain such information promptly by calling this office.
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"The Nature of an Oath"
By

FRANK SWANCARA

of the Denver Bar

Children offered as witnesses have frequently been compelled to disclose
their understanding of "the nature of an oath." I Thus a prosecutrix, 8 years
old, on being asked what would become of her if she told a lie, answered "I
would go to hell." The Supreme Court of Alabama held this proved that she
understood the "nature of an oath." 2
The nature of the common law oath, as required of Englishmen, is disclosed by unreserved expressions of early' judges. According to them, the
answer of the Alabama child was incomplete, for an oath of a witness would
imply that he or she would "go to hell" not for telling a lie, but for the violation of a promise to tell the truth. Chief Justice Willes made this clear by
3
giving the following illustration:
"It is in Matt. c. 14, v. 6 to 9 * * * that Herod having sworn to

Herodias that whatsoever she asked of him he would give it to her, though
he was exceeding sorry when she asked of him the head of Saint John
the Baptist, yet for his oath's sake * * * he would not reject her."

So Herod would have been given "hell" for the violation of the oath, but no
divine punishment, nor even wrath, was feared for beheading John.
Chief Justice Willes also cited Lactantius on the point that ancient gangsters not "afraid even of committing murder * * * durst not" break an oath.
The idea was that if, for example, one vows to kill, he will be punished by a
Diety for any breach of the implied promise or intention, and refusal to
commit murder would not mitigate the offense or punishment. The Bible "is
'the foundation of the common law," 4 and so, relevant to oaths, is the story of
Jephthah who vowed that he would "offer it up for a burnt-offering" whatever would come forth from the doors of his home to meet him. "His daughter came out to meet him," 5 and was later killed "according to his vow which
he had vowed." The father did not expect Jehovah to punish him for slaying
his "only child," but did fear a penalty for noncompliance with the vow.
The common law judges were not particular about oaths taken in foreign
lands by Jews, Gentoos, or Mahometans, but an oath taken by an English
gentile meant that the witness expected the punishments, if deserved, would
be inflicted after death. How tenacious was that idea is evidenced by the fact
that the highest court of Connecticut refused to qualify Hezekiah Scott because his belief was "that men were punished, in this life, for their sins, but
6
would all be made happy, immediately after death, by their Creator."1
'70 C. J. 101.
'Castleberry v. State, 135 Ala. 24, 33 So. 431 (1903).
'Omich'und v. Barker, Willes Rep. 538, 125 Reprint 1310.
' Wylly v. Collins, 9 Ga. 223, 237 (1851).
'Judges, c. 11, v. 34.
'Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. (2 Day, 2d series) 66 (1828).
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It was the policy of the early judges not only to preserve the original
"nature of the oath" for English subjects, but also to perpetuate the prevailing fear of hell. Justice Ashhurst regarded the sale of Thomas Paine's Age of
Reason as a crime for the reason, among others, that the work had a tendency
to strip the law "of one of its principal sanctions,-the dread of future punishment."'

When Daniel Webster was assailing that clause of Girard's will which
excluded every "minister" from the premises of Girard College, he said:"
"But what would be the condition of a youth coming fresh from
this college? He could not be a witness in any court. He had never
been taught to believe in a future state of rewards and punshments,
* *

*"

Webster, like the judges, refrained from answering the question, "punishments" for what? The dominant creeds and confessions of his time "taught"
that the severest penalty "in a future state" would be for rejecting the doctrine of Redemption. Writing of the damned, a poet gave these lines: 9
"For day and night, in their despite,
Their torment's smoke ascendeth,
Their pain and grief have no relief;
Their anguish never endeth."
A New York court solemnly expressed its fear that Universalists would
be made to suffer, not for perjuries or other secular misconduct, but for their
faith in universal salvation, that is, for their heresy. The exact words of the
judge, on that point, were: "'
"And however much I may regret the existence of a creed which
may jeopardize the future happiness of its possessor, * * *."
Judges never explained how the oath taker can have a "dread of future
punishment," in the words of Justice Ashhurst, if at the same time he adheres to a creed that permits escape by repentence and forgiveness. Judge
Cullen, howyever, did remind that the oath is being taken by those who believe
that one's "future state, whether of salvation or punishment, has been decreed
from all eternity, regardless of faith or good works." 11 That was a judicial
admission that it is, and has been, simply assumed that an oath taker has-fears
of divine punishment for perjury. Lawyers have not been deceived, and have
cross-examined oath-bound witnesses for the purpose of testing their veracity
or of inducing them to retract exaggerations. Even in the days when heresies
did not arise, when litigants had oath-helpers, one man's oath was not as
good as that of another, "a thegn's oath equalling those of six ceorls." I2 The
Williams Case, 26 Howell's State Trials 654 (1897).
'Vidal v. Girard's Exrs., 2 Howard 126, 176 (1844).

'Michael

Wiggelsworth, The Day of Doom (1662).

"Peo. v. Matteson, 2 Cowen 432 (1824).
"Brink v. Stratton, 176 N. Y. 150, 68 N. E. 148 (1903).

"'White, Making of the English Constitution 25 (1906).
a "churl." See Bouvier's L. D.

A "ceorl" may have-been
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rule should have been the converse, or reverse, for a ceorl, rather than a thegn,
would be terrifiied by Judge Jefferies' warning that "the bottomless lake of
fire and brimstone" will receive the witnesses who "waver one tittle from
the truth." 13
After Universalists became numerous in New York, and persisted in
denying hell, "rights of conscience" were respected, and lower courts there,
and later appellate courts elsewhere, began to hold that an oath may assume
any kind, place or length of divine punishment. Judges began to cite the
fact that after Atkyns reported the opinion of Willes in 1744, that Chief
Justice himself wrote out a revised opinion which referred to punishments
"in this world or in the next." 14 As affecting Englishmen, that was dictum,
for the court was deciding upon the validity of a purported oath of a Gentoo.
The highest court of Connecticut refused to fall in line, but adhered to Willes
as reported by Atkyns.'
The decisional shift with reference to the time and place of punishment
resulted in no breaking of judicial silence on what act is punished, whether
the falsehood or the breach of promise not to utter one. The revised opinion
of Willes mentions the oaths taken with the contract "betwixt Isaac and
Abimelech." An oath to prevent a breach of contract impiles that a breach
otherwise would not be perilous. From a modern, and an American, report
it may be found that during a court recess a minister instructed a child "that
God would punish her if, after taking the oath, she testified what was not
true." 10 Such instruction is revealing. It implies, also, that to lie when not
under oath is theologically safe, and evidently this has been believed, judging
by the multitudinous frauds since earliest times, and such warnings as caveat
emptor.
The oath originated long before any mediaeval creed was formulated,
and came to mean the making of a vow or promise to a Diety, yet Lord Coke
thought all non-Christians, including Jews, could not make oath in England.
The Supreme Court of Illinois said: 17
"In early times Lord Coke laid down the rule as excluding all not
Christians,-a rule as narrow, bigoted and inhuman as the spirit of
fanatical intolerance and persecution which disgraced his age and country."
The humanitarian court nevertheless excluded Ira Aldrich who had said:
"I feel obligated to tell the truth aside from the actions of the civil
law, and aside from what others may think of me."
The trouble was that Mr. Aldrich had no opinions on divine punishments,
and so could not testify, even to defend his own life or liberty.
Quoted in sec. 1816 Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.).
Peo. v. Matteson, 2 Cowen 432 (1824).

"Attwood v. Welton, supra, note 5.
Corn. v. Lynes, 142 Mass. 577, 8 N. E. 408 (1886).
' Central Co. v. Rockafellow, 17 Ill. 541, 552 (1856).
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Since most states have adopted the common law as it existed in 1607,
when oath taking by Christians required a belief in future punishments after
death, courts could plausibly hold that an oath now is the same as it was
then, but to avoid disqualifying too many persons they assume that an oath
is sufficient as such if the maker merely invokes the attention of his Diety,
without regard to penalties. Opinions of Willes' associates in Omychund v.
Barker 18 supply the authority.
Ordinarily, today, an oath must not be questioned or discussed, because
a constitution or statute makes all persons competent as witnesses. 19 This is
both just and practical, yet the Supreme Court Commission of Ohio published
the following statement: 20
"Under our constitution the character of a man's religious belief
is not permitted to affect his competency as a witness; yet, to render him
competent to take an oath as a witness, his moral nature must be strengthened * * * by a belief in a supreme being, who will certainly, either in
this life or in the life to come, punish perjury."
So hell may not yet be legally extinct, for the purpose of qualifying witnesses,
or defining an oath. The fires still burn for Wyoming residents, since the
note to section 89-1701 R.S. (Wyo.) 1931 cites as "applicable" the Ohio
decision above quoted.

Colorado University Revives Law Day
Law Day, another casualty of the war and post-war period, was revived
this year on May 15 by the University of-Colorado. The morning conference
was devoted to a panel discussion of the rules concerning depositions and
discovery and pre-trial procedure. Panel participants were Judge J. Foster
Symes, Judge Joseph J. Walsh, Philip S. Van Cise, Ben S. Wendelken, and
William H. Robinson, Jr., moderator. John 0. Rames, former Denver attorney, presently director of extension of the University, and soon to be faculty
member of the University of Wyoming, consumed the time of attending
attorneys and guests with one of his delightfully nonsensical after-luncheon
talks. Palmer Hoyt, editor of The Denver Post, was the evening after-dinner
speaker. Colorado U. wins a vote of thanks from Colorado lawyers for
reviving this interesting and worthwhile event.

Personals
formerly with Dickerson, Morrissey & Zarlengo, has removed
his office to 902 Midland Savings Bldg., Denver.
EDWIN JERSIN,

" 1 Atkyns 22, 26 Eng. Rep. Reprint 15 (1744).
" Hronek v. Peo., 134 I11.139, 24 N. E. 861, 8 L. R. A. 837.
20Clinton v. The State, 33 Ohio St. 27 (1877).
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Progress of Denver Municipal Code Revision
By J.

GLENN DONALDSON

City Attorney, City and County of Denver
At your request I am outlining the progress made and our tentative plans
concerning future work in achieving the codification of the Denver municipal
ordinances. This work was undertaken in July of 1947 and the first stage
concluded on January 15, 1948.
The work was done by Mr. George Craemer, a Denver attorney, under
the general supervision of this office. He was assisted by a staff of stenographers and typists which varied from one to five in number during the above
noted period. As you know, our ordinances had not been compiled or codified
since 1927 and the only source of information which could be depended on
was that afforded by Mr. Siewers Fincher, City Clerk. A W.P.A. project
of the mid '30's had bogged down after a reported expenditure of some
$10,000.00 and the material was in such shape it afforded no help to Mr.
Craemer in his undertaking.
Two methods of approach were available to us last June when the project
was in the planning stage. First, to place the project in the hands of some
professional firm like Michie and Company, the compilers and annotators of
the 1935 Colorado Statutes, or, second, to undertake the project locally under
our direct supervision.
After several discussions with officials of Michie and Company, BradfordRobinson Printing Company of Denver and the Denver Bar Association
Ordinance Codification Committee headed by Marmaduke Holt, we determined to undertake at least the first stage of the work locally. Our decision
was based on several grounds, the most important being the newly appointed
department heads to have available copies of ordinances involved in the operations of their departments at the earliest possible moment. Further, because of
the uncertain status of our charter, to which many ordinances are tied, it
seemed unwise to undertake the complete job until that uncertainty was
resolved.
Our needs seemed best served by the immediate undertaking of a mere
compilation of the ordinances together with a complete index. Such a compilation, and it is only that, appears in the forty-odd mimeographed five-volume
sets which attorneys will find in the following locations:
(1). The law libraries of the Majestic, Equitable, First National, E. & C.,
University and Symes Buildings.
(2). The Justice and Municipal Courts.
(3). The District Court, Supreme Court and Public Libraries.
(4). Principal city departments.
We mimeographed an additional number of copies of the ordinance
index. Copies of the index can be supplied for $1.00, and while a number of
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attorneys have obtained such copies, we still have 94 copies for sale. The
index is handy to the practicing attorney because through a quick reference
thereto one can learn whether or not there has been any ordinance enacted
upon the particular subject since 1927 and if found, the body of the ordinance
can be examined in the places above indicated.
It is well that I reiterate the materials at hand are mere compilations,
that is, a bringing together of all general ordinances enacted since 1927. No
attempt has been made to revise or edit such material and it does not cover
ordinances enacted since October 1, 1947. It is our intention to pick up subsequently enacted ordinances and issue a supplement to the compilation in the
near future.
The compilation now available to attorneys will be of no earthly good
to them unless they read and understand the preface to the index in Volume
V; I cannot over-emphasize this fact. It may be of interest to know that the
cost of the work to date is approximately $5000.00.

The.Second Stage
We originally contemplated undertaking of the second stage of the
project during the summer of this year and postponing our decision until that
time whether to continue the work locally or farm it out to a professional
ordinance codifying firm. Inquiry made of one such publisher indicated a
further cost of between $12,000.00 and $15,000.00. However, while awaiting
the outcome of the charter case, we are experimenting with a different approach
to the problem. A member of this staff is serving as executive secretary to the
Building Code Revision Committee. When that work is completed I intend
to assign her to the revision of miscellaneous police ordinances, most of which
are antiquated and a number of which are unquestionably unconstitutional.
If this approach proves successful up to that point, the reviser would be
assigned to the various departments to work with the department head and
others to bring our ordinance law into step with practices.
The speed in which the final publication date of the code is reached
under this method depends largely upon the size of the personnel assigned to
the task but it may take as long as two years. It is our present thinking that
the completed work, under this system of subject by subject revision, would
be in much better form than either of the two previously considered methods.
We have deeply appreciated the consideration given to the problem at
hand by the bar association committee and I know that from time to time we
will have need to call upon its members for their further advice. We invite
the criticisms and suggestions of all practicing attorneys to the end that we
eventually have an accurate and satisfactory code of municipal legislative
enactments.
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Upon Information and Belief
Ordinance Revision
In this issue of DICTA is an article by Denver City Attorney J. Glenn
Donaldson giving the status of the revision of the Denver municipal code and
asking for suggestions. DICTA, Upon Information and Belief, makes these suggestions. In the first place, we are glad that Mr. Donaldson saw fit to have
the work done to date done by local talent, and we hope that he will continue
to have all work on the municipal code done by local people. In the first
place, we think that Denver lawyers are just as competent as persons residing
abroad to codify, compile, arrange and index Denver ordinances. In fact we
think local attorneys are better qualified than are non-resident attorneys. We
feel that Denver lawyers who have practiced in Denver and have had to
familiarize themselves with some of the local ordinances are more likely to
know under what titles Denver lawyers will look for ordinances than are
persons who approach it purely from a theoretical standpoint. We also feel
that Denver lawyers are more likely to know than are non-residents what
ordinances are enforced, and what ordinances are not enforced, what ordinances are still in effect and what ordinances have fallen into disuse, and
in this latter connection we do not feel that there should be any republication
of the code until there has been a substantial overhauling of the present ordinances with a weeding out of numerous obsolete provisions. For example, we
know of no good reason why it should be necessary to continue to prohibit
the picketing of any animal between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.
We also note a provision requiring every streetcar to sound its gong when
approaching within sixty feet of any intersection. Whether this ordinance
is desirable or not, it certainly is not being respected.
We congratulate Mr. Donaldson on the work that has been done to date.
We are heartily in accord with a new codification by local people, and we
hope that this codification will be completed at the earliest possible date. We
wish to make this suggestion for the future. We feel that after the new
codification is published, Denver lawyers should have available either in
annual cumulative supplements or in looseleaf or other supplementary form
published either by the city or by the bar association, all amendments to the
ordinances, so that any lawyer may be able to advise a client on the status of
the municipal law without having, to make a trip to the court house to visit
the City Clerk's office or the City Attorney's Office, make personal inquiries
of the persons who have personal knowledge of the subject or use a crystal
ball or an ouija board. No one can be expected to respect" and obey the law,
unless he can know what the law is. For twenty years it has been impossible
for Denver residents to know with certainty what the law was on any given
subject. This condition should never be permitted to exist in the future.
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More Stuff Needed
Attention is directed to the invitation appearing on the title page of this
magazine: "The submission to the editors of articles of interest to the legal
profession is invited." For a number of months the editors of DICTA had a
surplus of material available. This created the problem of publishing the
articles most current and most pressing at the time of publication. Also,
because of this some available articles were taken out of the hands of the
editors and published in other publications. The situation has now completely reversed itself, and the editors are very desirous of receiving additional
material. We trust that the experiences in the past will not discourage authors
from submitting articles at this time.
In submitting articles we recommend that authors keep in mind the
following suggestions:
First, the articles should be as concise as possible while yet covering the
points to be covered.
Second, articles discussing a subject of general interest are more acceptable
than articles discussing a subject of limited interest. The more likely a particular point is to be encountered by a large number of the members of the
bar, the more desirous is its publication in DICTA. Even though very specific
points may be discussed, if the particular point is likely to be encountered by
a substantial number of practicing attorneys, the fact that the point is specific
does not detract from the desirability of the article from the publication standpoint.
A more adequate coverage of the activities of the local bar associations
and their committees and of the state bar association and of its sections and
committees is desired.
Back Issues of Dicta Available
The editors have on hand a limited supply of many of the back issues of
Any attorney wishing to fill out a set of DICTA may have any of the
back issues to the extent of their availability by addressing the editor, Hubert
D. Henry, 620 E. & C. Building, Denver. Please give the number of the
issues desired when writing for back issues.
JICTA.

Arthur T. Vanderbilt-Man of Action
In our opinion, one of the greatest men alive today is Arthur T. Vanderbilt. Mr. Vanderbilt is outstanding in his ability to convert ideas into action.
During his presidency of the American Bar Association (1937-1938) the
Judicial Administration section of that association brought forth its comprehensive report on improving the administration of justice which has done so
much to stir up in-erest and activity in this program. He was chairman of
the Advisory Committee on Military Justice of the War Department, chairman of the Advisory Committee of the United States Supreme Court on
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Rules of Criminal Procedure, member of the Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure, chairman of the committee that brought about
the adoption of legislation creating the administrative office of the United
States courts, and chairman of the National Committee on Traffic Law Enforcement. As Dean of the New York University School of Law, he was the
inspiration and founder of the annual survey of American Law and the Law
Center. He had been selected as the director of the survey of the legal profession and had plans for the survey well underway when he was appointed to
become chief justice of New Jersey and thus the head of the New Jersey courts
under the new judicial provision which will go into effect September 15. As

chief justice, it will be his task to reorganize the courts of New Jersey under
the new constitution adopted by that state last year, including the drafting of
rules of procedure.. His appointment as chief justice is the logical outgrowth
of the tremendous amount of time he has devoted to improving the administration of justice and the reorganization of courts, particularly in his own
state.
Typical of Mr. Vanderbilt's philosophy is the following statement of
his idea of the Law Center: "Fortunately, we have learned the art of cooperation in the Restatement of the Law by the American Law Institute, in
the work of the Advisory Committees of the Supreme Court on Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and .the American
Bar Association is about to apply it to its projected Survey of the Legal
Profession. Where and by whom must the task be done? Obviously not by
busy judges on the bench, nor by harassed legislators in Congress or at the
state capitol, nor by overburdened chief executives or department heads nor
by the captains of industry or labor, nor by law-school professors alone, but
by leaders of each of these groups working together and submitting their
product to the frank criticism of the rank and file. This is my vision of a
Law Center. Thus it is my hope that the new building to be erected on
Washington Square, with architecture reminiscent of the Inns of Court,
Independence Hall, and the buildings at Charlottesville designed by Jefferson,
may be one center of a nationwide movement that will mold our law to the
needs of the times, assuring to our people for another century and a half the
supremacy of law, a government of law and not of men, and above all
individual liberty."

Lawyers in the Public Service
L. WARDn BANNISTER, past president of the Denver Chamber of Commerce,

has been re-elected to the board of directors of the United States Chamber of
Commerce for the sixth consecutive term.
BARNARD A. HOUTCHENS, Greeley, has been appointed by Governor Knous

to the Board of Trustees of the Colorado teachers' colleges. He fills the
vacancy created by the recent death of E. Tyndall Snyder.
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Colorado Supreme Court Announces Rule Amendments
The Colorado Supreme Court has adopted the following amendments
to its rules:
Rules 201 and 204
Rulc 201, Rules of Civil Procedure, '35 C. S. A., be and the same is
hereby amended by adding thereto the following provision:
"Subject to prior approval by the Court, each member of the Law
Committee may appoint an assistant, who shall receive for his services One
Hundred Dollars, ($100'06) for each examination in which such assistant
participates."
Rule 204, Rules of Civil Procedure, '35 C. S. A., be and the same is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"204. Affidavit as to Qualifications-ExaminationFees.-Every applicant
shall accompany his application with an examination fee, which shall be Fifty
Dollars ($50.00) for applicants in Classes A and B, and, after July 5, 1948,
Fifteen Dollars ($15.00) for applicants in Classes C and D, and shall attach
thereto his own affidavit stating that he is a citizen of the United States; that
he believes in the form of government thereof, and has never been disloyal
thereto; that he is over the age of twenty-one years (giving his age); that he
is a citizen of Colorado (giving his address); that he has never been convicted
of a felony; and, if admitted, it is his intention to begin the practice of law
within this State, or the teaching of law in an approved law school in Colorado, within three months from the date of his admission, and to make the
same his permanent and usual occupation.
"Out of every examination fee paid by applicants in Classes A and B
a sum not exceeding Thirty-five Dollars ($35.00) shall be paid over to the
Bar Committee to defray the expenses of the Committee's investigation of
the character of such applicant."
Regularly adopted and approved by the Court on May 6, 1948.
Rule 117
Rule 117 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Rule 117-Oral Arguments.-Oral arguments may be had on final
hearing only by order of court, either on its own motion or on separate
written request or motion therefor filed by a party at any time prior to the
expiration of 15 days after the time when the reply brief may be filed; provided, however, that should the court conclude to make a final determination
of any cause on application for supersedeas, oral argument will be allowed
thereon if a separate motion therefor be filed before the expiration of 5 days
from the time the reply brief may be filed. The clerk shall give the attorneys
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notice of the date set for argument. Arguments will be limited to 30 minutes
to a side unless the court extends the time upon request filed before the date
of argument has been set. If a case is argued orally in department, a party
may during the argument request further oral argument should the case
be heard by the court en banc, and failure to make such request shall constitute a waiver of the privilege. Oral argument will not be permitted on
petition for rehearing. Failure to file opening, answer or reply brief shall
preclude the party so failing from demanding oral argument. Reading of
written or printed arguments or lengthy citations will not be permitted."
Effective June 3, 1948, and applicable to all pending cases.

Denver Bar Trustees Increase Dues
A meeting of the Board of Trustees and officers of the Denver Bar
Association was held on May 6, 1948.
The following officers and trustees were present:
Horace F. Phelps
Sydney H. Grossman
Foster Cline
Edward G. Knowles
Richard Tull
W. Clayton Carpenter
Caldwell Martin

M. B. Holt, Jr.
Stanley H. Johnson
T. Raber Taylor
William Hedges Robinson
Alex B. Holland
Donald M. Lesher

It was moved, seconded, and unanimously carried that the following
resolution be adopted:
RESOLVED That the annual dues to the Denver Bar Association
for the fiscal year from July 1, 1948, to June 30, 1949, shall be $15.00;
provided, however, that the annual dues shall be $7.50 for any member
who shall have been admitted on examination to practice law in Colorado
for three years or less at the time that the annual dues are payable.
It was moved, seconded, and unanimously carried that the following
resolution be adopted:
RESOLVED That the annual dues to the Denver Bar Association
be, and they hereby are, waived to the end of the first fiscal year in
which a member is admitted on examination to the practice of law in
Colorado.
It was moved, seconded, and unanimously carried that the following
resolution be adopted:
RESOLVED That any person who has previously been a member
of the Association may be reinstated to membership by payment of the
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current dues in full and a reinstatement fee in the amount of $5.00;
provided, however, that if such person has previously been dropped from
membership for cause other than non-payment of dues, his name shall
first be submitted to the Board of Trustees and reinstatement shall be
granted only upon majority action of said Board.
It was moved, seconded, and unanimously carried that the following
resolution be adopted:
RESOLVED That the following members of the Denver Bar Association who shall have practiced law in Colorado for fifty years or more
by June 30, 1949, be granted honorary life memberships under the ByLaws of the Denver Bar Association:
Admitted August 8, 1898
James D. Benedict
Admitted April 6, 1899
Orville L. Dines
Admitted January 26, 1899
William E. Hutton
Admitted August 15, 1898
F. R. Lilyard
Admitted February 10, 1898
Herbert M. Munroe
Admitted January 26, 1899
I. B. Melville
Admitted February 13, 1893
Horton Pope
It was moved, seconded and unanimously carried that the following
resolution be adopted:
RESOLVED That the following members of the Denver Bar Association, having retired from the active practice of the law, be granted
honorary life membership, without dues, because of eminence and honorable record at the bar:
Richard Peete
John D. Rogers
It was moved, seconded, and unanimously carried that the Secretary
draft a resolution expressing the gratitude of the Denver Bar Association to
the Trust Departments of the Denver Clearing House Banks for the publication and distribution of the Wills and Estates pamphlet.
It was moved, seconded, and unanimously carried that the attitude of
members of the Denver Bar Association be canvassed so that the Board of
Trustees may be directed in the adoption of a program of activity for the
association for the approaching year. Sydney H. Grossman, Foster Cline,
W. Clayton Carpenter, and Stanley H. Johnson were appointed as a committee to prepare a questionnaire to be distributed among the members of
the association. Edward G. Knowles and Horace F. Phelps were constituted
as a committee to consider the employment of an executive secretary, his
compensation and secretarial assistant, to investigate the rental of suftable
office space and cooperate with the Colorado Bar Association, and were granted
full authority to act.
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Admitted to a Higher Court
P. VORIEs, dean of Pueblo attorneys, died May 5 of a heart attack at
the age of 85. He was active in the practice until the time of his death.
HARRY

H. PERSHING died April 3 at the age of 84. He was born at Mount
Pleasant, Pennsylvania, December 27, 1863. He was graduated from Princeton University in 1888 and began law practice in Pittsburgh in 1890. He
moved to Denver in 1892. He was a member of the first charter convention
of Denver, and was professor of medical jurisprudence at Colorado University
from 1910 until 1927. An expert in municipal law, he was the senior member of one of Denver's leading law firms. He was active in civic, charitable
and church affairs. He has served as a member of the Bureau of Child and
Animal Protection, Colorado Civil Service Commission, president of the
Denver Board of Charities and Correction, member of the Public Library
Commission, trustee of Denver University, president of the United Charities
and the Community Chest, chancellor of the Episcopal Diocese of Colorado,
delegate to the general convention of the church, member of the sixth province on the National Council of the Protestant Episcopal Church of America.
He was a member of the Mile-High Club, the Denver Club and the Rocky
Mountain Princeton Club.
JAMES

ROBERT S. GAST died April 4 of a heart attack in Denver. He was 68.
A former president of the Colorado Bar Association, he was one of Colorado's best known attorneys. He took an active interest and part in bar
association meetings and activities, including those of the American Bar Association. He graduated from Yale University and Columbia Law School. He
has practiced law in Pueblo since 1905. A former law partner was the late
Senator Alva B. Adams. At the time of his death he practiced in partnership
with his son, Robert S. Gast, Jr., a member of the Colorado General Assembly.
He was legal adviser for several banks. During World War I he was a
commissioned aide to the adjutant general. He was active in Red Cross work
during and after the war and was relief agent during the Pueblo flood in
1921. He was a member of Phi Delta Phi, Denver Club, University Club of
Denver, Cactus Club, Mile-High Club, Minnequa Club of Pueblo, Yale
Club of New York, Pueblo Commercial Club and the Elks.

F. WINGREN died April 18 at 47, of a heart attack. He was born May
28, 1901 in Cheyenne, Wyoming, and,came to Denver as an infant. He began
practicing law in 1925 in Denver after graduating from Westminster Law
School. He was associated in practice with his brother, Ivor 0. Wingren,
member of the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association and
former Assistant United States Attorney. He was a Mason, member of the
Lakewood Country Club, Denver Press Club, and Augustana Lutheran
Church. He was an ardent fisher and hunter.
EARLE
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He had
practiced law in Denver for thirty years, and maintained offices in the E. & C.
Bldg., He had served as deputy district attorney under his cousin, John A.
Rush, before World War I. He held bachelor and master degrees from the
University of Michigan.
LEWIS C. RUSH died at the age of 59 in Madisonville, Kentucky.

MORTON M. DAVID died at his Denver home of a heart attack. He was born

in Aspen in 1888. From 1910 to 1917 he served as an officer for the Colorado
State Humane Society. He graduated from Westminster Law School. He
entered the army in 1917, and after his discharge helped to form the American
Legion, in the affairs of which he was a national figure. He was the first
adjutant of the Legion in Colorado and helped organize the Leyden-ChilesWickersham Post. In 1929 he was named national vice commander. He organized and conducted the junior American Legion baseball tournaments in the
1920's. He was a member of Temple Emanuel.

Inadequacy of Notice Provision for Obtaining
Treasurers' Deeds
By LAWRENCE M. HENRY
of the Denver Bar, Member of the Colorado General Assembly
Section 255, Chap. 142, '35 C. S. A., defining conditions precedent to
the issuance of treasurers' deeds requires notice of purchase for taxes "on
every person in actual possession or occupancy ot such lands, lots or premises," but the provision that such notice may be served "by personal service
or by registered mail" in my opinion is inadequate. Nor does the publication
requirement provide the necessary protection to the occupant owner, since
such publications are so seldom read by lay people.
The alternative of serving by registered mail is too often followed. Since
personal service is not the exclusive means of service the easier method of
mailing a notice is more often used. Unlike the requirement of Rule 4 (g) (1)
relating to service of summons and that of Section 253, Chapter 176, relating
to probate citations and notices to sell real estate where service is not complete until there is filed a return receipt signed by the addressee, service has
been held to be complete when the notice has been registered and deposited
in the mail bearing the proper post office address (Ford v. Genereaux, 104
Colo. 17). There is no requirement that return receipt be obtained, let
alone that it be signed by the addressee only. Since service is complete upon
mailing it seems to me that the additional charge of registering the letter is
sheer waste. Registering a letter is a method by which its progress and
receipt might be checked and as the statute is now written receipt is not
pertinent.
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The statute's emphasis upon mailing and not upon receipt has caused
this situation to arise and which is soon to be litigated outside of Denver.
The county treasurer concerned directed the registered letter to the owner
occupant giving as her address the postoffice of the community in which she
actually lived. However, her mail was delivered to her house by the usage
of her street address and a postal zone of a large city nearby. She in fact
never collected her mail at the small postoffice and there were no delivery
facilities from it. The registercd letter in time was returned uncalled for and
without serving its purpose of notifying the owner-occupant that a treasurer's
deed had been requested by the tax certificate purchasers. But it is being
argued that the envelope was properly addressed and the procedure entirely
valid.
I cannot see any validity to the argument that the Rules and the section
in the chapter on estates both relate to court procedures and therefore greater
care to assure notice is required. Loss of ownership of property is just as
serious notwithstanding the method involved.
I recommend that the next scssion of the legislature amend Section 255
to provide that service on the occupant of the premises be by personal service
or by registered mail evidenced by a return receipt signed by addressee only.

Army Needs Attorney to Serve in Austria
The Department of the Army in connection with its work in supervising
the administration of liberated countries is in urgent need of the services of
an attorney-advisor to serve in Vienna, Austria. This position is under the
protection of Civil Service although it does not confer permanent Civil Service
status. It is rated under the Civil Service scale at P-5, the pay for which is
$5905.20, augmented by a 25% overseas differential, making a total annual
salary of $7381.50. Living conditions in Austria compare favorably to those
of the U. S. All normal civilian facilities are available through Army sources.
The Government will pay the employee's transportation from the U. S. to
Austria and also the cost of return at the termination of his two-year contract.
Dependents will be able to accompany the employee to Austria or to join
him within a very short time at Government expense. The Government will
make available adequate housing facilities at a reasonable cost.
The duties of this position are: to represent the U. S. element in the
Quadripartite Legal Sub-Committee; to render legal opinions, either verbally
or in writing, on questions involving Austrian law; to translate laws, legal
documents and correspondence involving legal terminology from German into
English and from English into German; to review cases tried by the Austrian
courts in the U. S. Zone in order to assure that democratic principles of trial
are observed; and to maintain liaison with the Austrian Ministry of Justice
and Austrian court authorities.
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From the above duties it will be seen that the following must be minimum
qualifications: Approximately 10 years actual legal practice in U. S.; complete fluency in the German language to include German legal terminology;
some knowledge of AustroGerman law.
Any persons who feel that they possess the above qualifications are
urged to apply to the Personnel and Training Branch, Civil Affairs Division,
Department of the Army, Pentagon, Washington 25, D.C., for further information and consideration for this post. Application should be made in quadruplicate on Form 57, Application for Federal Employment, which may be
obtained at any post office.

Short Course in Municipal Court Procedure
By

HUBERT

D.

HENRY

Presiding Judge, Municipal Court, Denver

Although many lawyers never appear in the Municipal Court, and many
others seldom appear, a brief summary of some of the practices in this court
will not be out of the way, particularly as these rules of practice are nowhere
else recorded, thus making it necessary for the lawyer to rely entirely on
personal observation and the observations of other attorneys with whom he
might discuss matters. Even though attorneys appear in but a small proportion of the cases in the Municipal Court, the importance of the Municipal
and Justice Courts in the judicial structure cannot be over emphasized, particularly when one considers the tremendous volume of cases handled, and
further when one realizes that, because of the small amounts involved and
the impracticability of appeals, these courts are in 99 % of the cases courts of
last resort.
Some attorneys appear rather regularly in the Municipal Court. Some
appear quite infrequently. Almost every attorney will at some time make
an appearance in this court. Friendship, relationship, desire to champion one
believed to be greatly wronged, will sometimes bring into the Municipal Court
eminent counsel who would never come into this court for the maximum fee
possible to realize in such cases. So it is that this brief summary, although
possibly not of immediate use to many, may at any time become of use to
any practicing attorney.
Court Organization
The Municipal and Justice Court of Denver has four divisions. Division
1 is presided over by Judge Edward C. Day. Division 2 is presided over by
Judge David Oyler. These two divisions meet in the City and County Building, and try cases involving regular justice of the peace jurisdiction, both civil
and criminal. Division 3 is presided over by Judge Frank E. Hickey, and tries
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cases involving municipal ordinance violations, except traffic. Division 4 is
presided over by Judge Hubert D. Henry, and tries violations of the municipal
traffic ordinances. These two divisions sit in the Police Building. The four
judges may and do exchange divisions on occasion, and also assist one another
in disposing of cases when occasion demands. The balance of this paper will
discuss procedure in Divisions 3 and 4 only, particularly the traffic court,
Division 4.
Continuances
Continuances are not granted as a matter of right, but only as a matter
of discretion. The proper way to get a continuance is to get in touch with
the officers in the case in advance of the, date of trial and agree with them as
to the continuance. This gives the officers an opportunity to notify witnesses
not to appear. It is an imposition on witnesses, and other defendants when
there are more than one defendant in the same incident, to allow them to
appear in court and then ask for the continuance, which would make them
return at a future date. Many of these persons lose time at their work, don't
want to appear anyway, and won't appear the second time when a continuance is granted under these circumstances. Therefore, the judges are very
hesitant to grant continuances unless arrangements have been made in advance
of the date of trial with the officers so that witnesses do not appear unnecessarily. Second continuances are practically never granted.
Process
Summonses and subpoenas are issued either by the clerk or a deputy
clerk of the court, or by a member of the police department. Under an ordinance passed this year, a summons or subpoena issued by a member of the
police department is a good summons or subpoena, and failure to appear in
response to such a summons or subpoena can be penalized. Under this
ordinance any summons or subpoena is to be served by a police officer.
Defaults
Under the ordinance passed this year, if the defendant does not appear
when his case is set for trial, the court may take the testimony -of the appearing witnesses and enter judgment by default against the-defendant. This can
be done as actions for the violation of a municipal ordinance are civil, not
criminal, actions. If the defendant is out on bond, judgment by default can
be entered, and the bondsman directed to produce the defendant within the
time fixed by the court, or pay his fine.
Witness Fees and Costs
Every witness appearing in response to a written subpoena is entitled to
witness fees of $1.50 for each session attended. These fees must be claimed
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at the time of the trial, and are added to the fine of the defendant, if the
defendant is found guilty. If the defendant is discharged, the witnesses are
still entitled to their fees. Regular costs in the Municipal Court for actions
for the violation of a municipal ordinance have been done away with, and at
present the only costs one will encounter in these cases are the $1.00 fee
for making bond, the $1.50 fee for an appeal, and witness fees. Under
this year's ordinance, several violations of one defendant arising out of a
single incident or series of incidents may be consolidated for the purposes of
filing complaint, serving process, trial and appeal (but not fixing the fines),
so on an appeal there is a single fee of $1.50 in the Municipal Court and
$7.50 in the County Court, replacing the former $1.50 and $7.50 for each
charge.
Tria~l
Because of the great number of cases to be tried, approximately 3500 a
month, it is impossible to permit a leisurely conduct of a case. The most
expedient way of trying a case is to receive the statement of the case from
the officer and from each principal. After these statements have been received, cross examination by the city and the defense is permitted, and then
other witnesses may be examined and cross examined. Usually the statement
of the case by the officer is merely a summary of the apparent facts, which
includes matters other than evidence, so a cross examination of the officer is
not particularly fruitful. Receiving the statements of the officer and the
principals first is in accord with practice in other courts when we consider the
preliminary statements of counsel in a civil or criminal trial, or when we
consider pre-trial procedure. These statements reveal the position of each
defendant, show where the positions of the respective defendants are at
variance, and thus upon what facts further inquiry must be made. Handling
a trial in this manner greatly shortens the presentation of a case.
In trying municipal ordinance violation cases, attorneys should remember
that the sole issue is whether or not the ordinance was violated, and the presentation of evidence should be limited to this issue and matters in extenuation, mitigation and aggravation. Negligence and other damage issues are
not in issue, and evidence bearing on negligence, but not on the question of
the violation of the law, is impertinent and merely prolongs trial without
benefit. Some attorneys attempt to take depositions for following damage
actions in the Municipal Court. This seems to me to be a waste of time and
money because some questions which might be pertinent and important in a
damage case are impertinent and unimportant in an ordinance violation case,
and such questions cannot be brought out in the violation trial, whereas
they could be brought out at the deposition hearing if regularly conducted. Negligence and law violation are not the same issue. I have seen
cases where there could well have been negligence, but no violation of
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the law, and I have also seen cases where there was a violation of the
law, but undoubtedly no negligence. In accident cases, it is often true that
both drivers violated an ordinance, and that both drivers were guilty of negligence. However, violation and negligence are two different issues and should
be tried separately, and attorneys, particularly those representing insurance
companies, should not consider the finding of the court on the law violation
determinativie of the question of negligence.
Order of Cases
At the present time, afternoon dockets are very heavy and morning dockets are light. This means that an attorney must sometimes sit through a
large part of a long afternoon docket before his case is reached. It is unfortunate that this situation exists. Two shifts of officers set their cases for
afternoon. One shift is the one that works from 8 P.M. to 4 A.M. The
officers on this shift are trying cases while off duty and during what corresponds, roughly, to the middle of the night for us. The other shift trying
afternoon cases is the shift which works from noon to 8 P.M. These officers
are on duty, but while in court are not available for law enforcement purposes. Some cases take longer than others. Sometimes a dozen cases are tried
in one hour and the next hour is devoted to one case. The disposition of a lot
of small cases early in the docket meets the convenience of more taxpayers
and citizens than the trial of one long case first, and a lot of small cases late
in the afternoon.
All these various considerations make the arranging of cases on a docket
a difficult job, with no one really satisfied. It probably happens that, in
trying to give first considerations first attention, under the pressure of a long
docket, some errors are made.
Traffic Tickets
In conclusion, a brief statement as to the m-.thod of handling traffic
tickets may be in order. The law does not guarantee that innocent people will
not have to stand trial. The law does try to assure a fair trial for all persons
accused of an infraction of the law. So it is that a traffic ticket may be issued
to a person who does not deserve it. That person has the right to be tried for
the offense, and if found innocent to have the charges dismissed. Any person
who receives a traffic ticket which he does not think he deserves should arrange
with the clerk of the violations bureau or another deputy clerk of the court
to have the case set for trial. The officer will be notified, and the officer and
alleged violator will appear in court at the time set, and the charge will be
tried just as any other charge is tried. Traffic tickets are not tried over the
telephone or by mail. They are all tried in court. Persons who receive traffic
tickets are given an opportunity to have the charges heard in court, but they
are not given an opportunity to discuss the merits of their tickets privately
with the judge, the Manager of Safety and Excise, or a police officer.
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Practicing Law Institute Summer Session
Trial techniques with lectures, demonstrations and panel discussions will
be among the high lights of the ten courses in the seventh annual summer
session for lawyers to be conducted by the Practicing Law Institute in New
York City beginning July 6.
A four weeks' program has been announced by Harold P. Seligson,
director. Sessions again will be held in the United States Court House where
lawyers from 37 states attended lectures and clinics last summer.
In addition to two weeks on trials and related subjects, the program includes the following: General Practice, Current Problems in Patent Law,
Current Problems in General Practice, Current Problems in Labor Law, Fedcral Taxes and Tax Procedure, and Tax Planning and Practice. Classes will
meet from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 2:30 to 4:30 p.m. each day, Monday through
Friday, excepting the first week which includes several night sessions because of the Independence Day holiday.
Preparation as the foundation of successful court work is emphasized
in the Trial Practice course scheduled for the week of Monday, July 19. Beginning with marshalling the evidence the lectures to be given at morning
sessions discuss step by step the preparation of typical civil cases. Techniques
and tactics to be employed under various circumstances are the keynotes of
the program. The afternoon sessions will be devoted to negligence cases and
the handling of actions involving personal injuries.
The second part of the trials program, scheduled for the week of July
26, consists of technique demonstrations and medico-legal jurisprudence.
Each four-hour morning session will present a part of a typical trial followed
by detailed analysis and evaluation of the tactics and strategy employed.
Actual court-room conditions will be recreated. The afternoon lectures are
aimed to provide medical knowledge needed by attorneys in handling personal
injuries actions and claims under life insurance policies.
Simultaneously with the trials program, the summer session will provide
two weeks of federal taxation. The course on Federal Taxes and Tax Procedure during the week of July 19 presents the basic aspects of income, gift
and estate taxes and related practice and procedure. This course is planned
to provide a working knowledge of the tax laws and of the techniques adapted
to handling typical tax matters. Guidance in analyzing and planning a
client's affairs for future tax savings will be given by lectures and clinic sessions in the course on Tax Planning and Practice during the week of July 26.
The four weeks' program will be opened with two intensive four-day
lecture courses, from July 6 through July 9, one on general practice and the
other on current problems in the patent field. The general practice course
deals with the preparation of documents and explanations of strategy and
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tactics in conducting negotiations and proceedings, working methods and the
techniques of the expert in various phases of a general law practice.
Major current problems in patent law in the light of their business
background and trends will be discussed by experienced practitioners, each
an expert in his particular field. They will explain step by step how they
handle typical problems in securing and exploiting patents, litigation and
developing inventions.
These will be followed, during
current problems in general practice
The former provides a comprehensive
handling of typical matters involving
estates, including a review of the tax

this week of July 12, by courses on
and on current problems in labor law.
discussion of current techniques for the
clients' business affairs, investments and
aspects.

The lectures on labor law are intended for general practitioners as well
as those engaged in labor work. The lectures analyze the amended National
Labor Relations Act and other provisions of the law and explain the various
phases of the work of lawyers in labor-management problems.
Appropriate institute monographs and related problem analysis supplements are furnished as texts in the courses on general practice, trial practice and taxation. Selected monographs from the institute's five series are
included in several other courses. Text materials will be forwarded in advance to enrollees if desired.
Lawyer war veterans entitled to educational benefits upder the GI Bill
of Rights may participate in the summer session and have all their fees, including the cost of text materials, paid by the Veterans Administration.
Additional information may be obtained from the Practicing Law Institute,
57 William Street, New York City.
Schedules are so arranged that although two different courses are in
progress at all times, related courses are given in weekly sequence. The program for the four weeks follows:
July 6 to 9-General Practice; Current Problems in Patent Law.
Week of July 12-Current Problems in General Practice; Current Problems in Labor Law.
Week of July 19-Federal Taxes and Tax Procedure; Trial Practice; Negligence Cases.
Week of July 26-Tax Planning and Practice; Trial Technique
Demonstrations; Medico-Legal Jurisprudence.

SUPPLIES FOR THE
LAWYER'S OFFICE
.. Designed by a lormer Government expert
Bookkeeping System that Simplifies
Work for Clients with Tax Problems

COLBURN
DENVER'S FIREPROOF HOTEL
D. B. Cerise is the genial host and
Manager
• Convenient, pleasant and reliable
surroundings.
* Excellent Food-Dining that has satisfied the demanding tastes of all
patrons.
Visit Our New Cocktail Lounge
Phone MAin 6261
Denver
Tenth Avenue at Grant Street

RUBBER STAMPS
CORPORATE SEALS
LEGAL BLANKS
LAMPS
PERSONAL INVESTMENT
RECORDS

In the Heart of Downtown
Denver

Court Place Hotel
J. W. "Johnny"

ATKINS, Owner

Rooms Available for 2, 3 or 4
Persons
Denver, Colo.
1635 Court Pl.
STATIONERY CO.

Phone Reservations Accepted

Call MAin 4237

Denver 2

1641 California St.

ATTORNEYS
Send Your Legal Notices to

G. K. LARSON

The Brighton Blade

CONTRACTOR

OFFICIAL NEWSPAPER
for Adams County and City of Brighton

Brick Work a Specialty
5781 Rhea Ave.

Arvada, Colo.

Phone Arvada 1310-W

ALICE M. BROWNING
TAbor 5953

1. Larger paird circulation than all other
Adams County newspapers combined.
2. Member. Audit Bureau of Circulations.
:3. Clean print--maximum readability.

We Solicit Your Use of this Official
Newspaper
W. C. Dorr, Publisher
Brighton, Colo.
Phone 520

REPORTER,
SHORTHAND
CERTIFIED
DEPOSITIONS,
COURT REPORTING,
REFERENCES and CONVENTIONS
Denver, Colorado

801 Midland Savings Building

ATTENTION LAWYERS:

Buy your Law Books,

New or Second Hand,

and

send your Abstracts and Briefs to your Local Law
Book Publisher. Lowest Prices in the West. Prompt Service-Delivery As You Want It.

COURTRIGHT PUBLISHING CO.
1609 Court Place

Denver 2, Colo.

Dicta Advertisers Merit Your Patronage
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